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Not  -So-Precious Metal 
The recent cycle of inflationary boom and 
disinflationary recession has been accom-
panied (as  always) by a massive boom-and-
bust cycle in world commodity markets. The 
silver market in particular has witnessed 
severe price swings in this period. These 
movements have reflected, first, a major 
cyclical expansion in the world economy, 
aggravated by the attempt of some traders to 
dominate the silver market in late 1979 and 
early 1980-and then the economic reces-
sion and speculative liquidation of stocks 
during the past two years.  By early this week, 
therefore, the New York producer price had 
dropped to $6.02 per troy ounce-back to 
the 1979 low and far below the peak of 
$48.00 reached in January 1980. 
Congress decreed a $1.29-per-ounce 
monetary value of silver in 1792, and 
maintained that value until the mid-1960s, 
when market forces and burgeoning inflation 
forced the demonetization of  the noble wh  ite 
metal. But silver's market price generally 
lagged far below the monetary value 
throughout most of the nation's history. After 
World War II, the market value of $0.90 per 
ounce was kept there only by a massive 
Treasury-purchase program, which led to the 
accumulation of 3.2 billion ounces of metal 
over a quarter-century. 
But with the Vietnam inflation, the market 
price almost tripled to $2.56 in 1968-and 
then reached $6.70 at the 1974 speculative 
peale This price upsurge reflected a 
worldwide industrial boom and heavy 
speculative demand associated with a series 
of international financial crises. But in 
addition, it reflected the widening gap 
between worldwide consumption and 
current production, as well as the increasing 
need to rely on Treasury and other stockpiles. 
The white metal's impressive physical 
characteristics contributed to a substantial 
increase in consumption until recent years. It 
is foremost in electrical and thermal 
conductivity, highest in optical reflectivity, 
and second only to gold in ductility. By the 
early 1970's, therefore, silver had gained new 
luster am'ong dentists as well as debutantes, 
and among spacemen as well as shutterbugs. 
Although consumption then began to 
weaken in response to rising prices, 
speculative forces took over in the late 1970's 
to drive prices to unprecedented heights. 
No longer money 
The nation's silver problems can be traced 
back several decades, to the time when a 
substantial gap first developed between u.s. 
(and world) consumption and current 
production. (The U.s. generally accounts for 
more than one-third of the non-Communist 
world's total demand.) The U.S. metthe chal-
lenge in the early 1960s by exhausting almost 
all of the Treasury's stockpile, most of which 
disappeared in a futile effort to retain silver's 
monetary role. Eventually, Congress passed 
legislation to withdraw all silver-backed 
currency from circulation (1963), and then to 
replace silver-with other metals in the 
nation's coinage (1965). But by that time, 
practically all of  the Treasury's original 
3.2-billion-ounce stockpile had  gone. 
Industrial consumption of silver reached 
all-time highs in the 1973 boom, but then 
began to decline as a reflection of the rising 
price trend. U.s. consumption in 1981  just 
about equalled the 1971  figure, but fell 
one-third below the 1973 pealdigure-see 
chart. Total world production meanwhile 
increased 11  percent between 1971  and 
1981-but  production in 1981, at 264 
million ounces, fell far below world industrial 
usage of 363 million ounces. To fill this 
contiQuing gap meant drawing down, year 
after year, the stockpiles built up over the 
centuries for coinage, investment and 
speculative purposes. 
Speculative bubble 
Amidst the inflationary flight into goods 
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unique supply-demand situation led many 
speculators to invest even more heavily in 
that specific commodity. Most of the 
headlines at the time were garnered by the 
activities of two investment groups-one 
centered around the Hunt family of Dallas, 
and another centered around several foreign 
traders acting through the Conti-Commodity 
commission houses. Their activities 
contributed significantly to a 675-percent rise 
in silver prices between January 1979 and 
January 1980, and tnen to a subsequent 
collapse. According to the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, in December 
1979 the two groups owned outright (or 
controlled through futures contracts) more 
than 250 million ounces of silver. In the 
words of the House Government Operations 
Committee, "Although a number of political 
and economic factors contributed to silver 
price movements during 1979-80, the 
primary cause of the abrupt rise in price 
and the resulting disorderly markets, both 
cash and futures, was the millions of ounces 
of physical silver taken off the markets by 
the major speculators, the Hunt and Conti 
groups." 
The bubble burst in January 1980, and the 
price slide accelerated in March when buyers 
of futures contracts on the commodity 
exchanges had trouble meeting margin calls. 
In the process, silver dropped in price to 
$11 .10 from the January peak of $48.00 an 
ounce. (The silver debacle reflected, in 
exaggerated form, the price decline then 
occurring in all commodity markets.) The 
Hunt brothers' role ended when their Placid 
Oil Co. obtained a $1.1-billion loan 
(renegotiated this March) from a consortium 
of 20 foreign and U.S. banks, on the 
understanding that they would expeditiously 
dispose of their 60-million-ounce silver 
holdings and refrain from future commodity 
speculation. On the regulatory side, the 
episode ended with new government and 
commodity-exchange controls on trading in 
contracts for silver futures. 
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Stronger prices? 
With the spread of  a worldwide recession, the 
si Iver market has now seen prices drop even 
further, to only about half of the lowpoint 
reached during the March 1980 market 
collapse. In the process, the ratio of gold to 
si Iver prices has risen to about 50-1, 
compared to a 32-1  ratio prevailing 
throughout most of the 1970s and a 5-1  ratio 
that the Hunt brothers reportedly considered 
reasonable. Still, amid all of the bearish 
factors now dominating the market, several 
influences-in addition to the usual cyclical 
upturn in business activity-could help boost 
si Iver prices. 
Prices could rise again if inflation resurfaces, 
especially in view of  silver's traditional role as 
an inflation hedge. Inflation and monetary 
uncertainties have historically generated 
interest in silver, and this will continue to be 
true. Indeed, speculative factors generally 
have dominated price movements during 
periods of rapid inflation. 
Weaker prices? 
Most other factors, however, point in the 
direction of further price weakness. The 
declining trend in U.S. industrial consump-
tion is a crucial factor in this regard. Between 
1978 and 1981, for example, use of silver in 
photographi~  materials declined 22 percent, 
and use in sterling and electroplated ware 
dropped 51  percent, reflecting the attractive-
ness of silver substitutes and increased 
recycling of materials, plus technological 
breakthroughs occurring in photography and 
other fields. 
A potential increase in supplies is also a 
possibility. According to the Handy and 
Harman processing firm, some 500 million 
ounces have come out of India in the past 15 
years, and more seems to be available-
although of course the stock is not 
inexhaustible. This flow appears to react 
quickly to price changes, although the 
liquidation rate has held up even at the relatively low prices of the past two years. 
In addition! some supplies could become 
available from the U.S. strategic stockpile of 
138 million ounces. Actually, the General 
Services Administration held several sales of 
stockpile silver last fall, but suspended sales 
after opposition arose from domestic and 
foreign producers. But that stockpiled metal 
still could be sold at some later time, thereby 
depressing market prices. 
Even greater supplies potentially overhang 
the market, however, in the form of the 350 
million ounces held by investors and 
speculators throughoutthe world (Handy and 
Harman estimate). The Hunt brothers' 
estimated 60-million-ounce holdings are 
only the most obvious portion of that supply. 
Future price levels will depend to a 
considerable extent on the speed with which 
such stocks are liquidated. And an even 
larger supply consists of the 90-percent-
silver U.S. coins that have practically dis-
appeared from circulation. Large quantities 
of  these old coins-which total an estimated 
655 million ounces-could come into the 
market, especially in the light of today's high 
interest charges for carrying silver inven-
tories. Indeed, many holders of coins (or 
other forms of silver) might be strongly 
tempted to dump their supplies on the 
market. 
Altogether, silver as a commodity could be 
expected to rise in price over the long term, 
in view of the fundamental gap between 
worldwide industrial demand and new mine 
production. Indeed, futures-market 
developments recently have indicated some 
strengthening of prices. But the near-term 
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future probably will be dominated by the 
actions of speculators and investors, as has 
been the case for the past several years. In the 
absence of  another inflationary upsurge, with 
another massive flight into goods, the large 
silver stocks now overhanging the markets 
could keep prices near current levels for 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages . 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,834  7.3 
12,042  9.5 
6,295  16.9 
4,858  9.3 
413  1.8 
284  18.8 
360  I- 5.6 
827  I- 5.3 
2,097  I- 5.3 
1,226  I- 4.5 
434  1.4 
13,011  16.2 
13,086  18.6 
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